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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The banking industry around the
world has witnessed remarkable
changes in recent decades, given
the increasing wave of
globalization, structural and
technological changes, and
integration of financial markets. As
McKinnon and Shaw (1973)
observed in their seminar work on
the key roles of banks as
propellants of growth and
development in developing
economies, a feeble banking
system is repressive, distortionary
and dis-connects the
intermediation process thereby
precipitating macroeconomic
instability. This requires that policy
makers, as Nnanna (2005) opines,
must articulate robust policies that
will deepen the financial system to
enable banks play their roles most
efficiently.
In Nigeria, the ability of the banking
industry to play its role has been
periodically punctuated by its
vulnerability to systemic distress
and macroeconomic volatility,
making policy fine-tuning
inevitable. Nnanna (2005) showed
that, historically, the Nigerian
banking industry had evolved in
four stages. The first stage can be

best described as the un-guided
laisez faire phase (1930-59), during
which several poorly capitalized
and unsupervised indigenous
banks failed in their infancy. The
second stage was the control
regime (1960-1985), during which
the Central Bank of Nigeria ensured
that only “fit and proper” persons
were granted banking license,
subject to the prescribed minimum
paid-up capital. The third stage was
the post Structural Adjustment
Programme (SAP) or de-control
regime (1986-2004), during which
the neo-liberal philosophy of “free
entry” was over-stretched and
banking licenses were dispensed
by the political authorities on the
basis of patronage. The emerging
fourth stage is the era of
consolidation (2004 to a
foreseeable future), with major
emphasis on recapitalization and
proactive regulation based on riskbased or risk-focused supervision
framework.
Consequently, the banking system
reforms were focused on further
liberalization of banking business;
ensuring competition and safety of
the system; and proactively
positioning the industry to perform
the role of intermediation and
playing a catalytic role in economic
development.
This paper is therefore aimed at
reviewing the various reforms in the
Nigerian banking industry since
1986.
I n p a r t i c u l a r, t h e
complementary policies and
outcomes of the recent reforms in
the industry as well as the issues
and challenges will be highlighted.
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The paper therefore has seven main
sections. Following this introduction
is section 2 which presents the
experience of other jurisdictions in
consolidation, while section 3
reviews reforms in the Nigerian
banking industry in two parts: early
reforms 1986, 2003 and the recent
reforms 2004 to date. Section 4
presents the actions taken by the
CBN toward ensuring a successful
consolidation of the banking
industry. Section 5 x-rayed the
outcome of the consolidation
exercise, while section 6 analyses
the main issues and challenges of
the recent reforms in the sector.
Finally, concluding remarks are
presented in section 7.
2.0 COUNTRY EXPERIENCES
The financial services industry is
restructuring and consolidating at an
unprecedented pace around the
globe, particularly in the United
States, Western Europe and Asia.
Specifically, in the period 19971998, 203 bank mergers and
acquisitions took place in the euro
area. In 1998 a merger in France
resulted in a new bank with a capital
base of US$688 billion, while the
merger of two banks in Germany in
the same year created the second
largest bank in Germany with a
capital base of US$541 billion. In
Japan, a spectacular merger has
produced the new Tokyo-Mitsubishi
bank with over $700 billion in assets.
In many emerging markets,
including Argentina, Brazil and
Korea consolidation has also
become prominent, as banks strive

to become more competitive and
resilient to shocks as well as
reposition their operations to cope
with the challenges of the
increasingly globalized banking
systems. Each continent except
Africa (with possible exception of
South Africa) has had a fair share of
merging banks. In Africa where
many banks are small in size in
terms of their market capitalization,
mergers in terms of volume and
value have been relatively low. The
five largest banks in Africa Standard
Bank Group, Amalgamated Bank of
South Africa (ABSA) Ltd, Nedcor
Ltd , First National Bank Ltd and
Investment Group Ltd are based in
South Africa and are all the result of
mergers and consolidations.
Standard Bank Group is the largest
banking group in South Africa and
Africa as a whole, and was the
result of the consolidation of several
financial institutions over a period of
ten years. As at end- December
2003, its shareholder funds totaled
R28, 667 million or $4.6 billion.
Similarly, the Amalgamated Banks
of South Africa Limited is the
second largest in the country and
Africa as a whole with a shareholder
fund base of R19,350 million or $3.1
billion. The bank was the result of
the merger of over fifteen
commercial banks, whole banks,
finance houses, insurance
companies and advisory services
across South Africa, Namibia,
Tan z a n i a , M o z a m b i q u e a n d
Zimbabwe. As a result of the
merger, the bank has been able to
create a powerful financial base that
enables it to provide services to
selected markets in the UK, and
USA.
In Nigeria, before the recent
reforms, the minimum capitalization
for existing banks stood at $7.53
million, while new banks were
required to have a minimum
capitalization of $15.06 million, as
against $526.4 million minimum

capitalization in Malaysia. The
largest bank in Nigeria before the
consolidation exercise had a
capitalization of $240 million, while
the total capitalization of the then 89
banks stood at $3.0 billion.
3.0

REFORMS IN THE
NIGERIAN BANKING
INDUSTRY

3.1

The Early Reform Measures
in the Nigerian Banking
Industry: 1986 - 2003

Empirical evidence has shown that
environmental dynamics
occasioned by globalization, the
changing international financial
architecture and technological
innovation have necessitated
financial sector reforms and the
fine-tuning of rules guiding the
practice of banking in many
jurisdictions. In Nigeria, prior to the
reforms of 1986, the banking sector
was highly repressed. Interest rate
controls, selective credit guidelines,
ceilings on credit expansion and
use of reserve requirements and
other direct monetary control
instruments were typical features of
the financial sector in Nigeria. Entry
into banking business was
restricted and public sector-owned
banks dominated the industry.
The neo-liberal era witnessed the
dismantling of the prolonged
regime of economic and financial
controls to make way for increased
reliance on market forces in 1986 in
line with the general philosophy of
economic management under the
Structural Adjustment Programme
(SAP). The major reform measures
implemented included,
deregulation of interest rates and
exchange rate, removal of sectoral
credit allocation and free entry into
banking business subject to
satisfaction of condition for
obtaining a banking licence. Other
measures implemented were the
establishment of the Nigeria

Deposit Insurance Corporation
(NDIC), strengthening the
regulatory and supervisory
institutions, upward review of
capital adequacy standards,
capital market deregulation and
introduction of indirect monetary
policy instruments. Besides, in
1991 the government
promulgated the Central Bank of
Nigeria (Act No.24) and the Bank
and Other Financial Institutions
Act (No.25) which spelt out
comprehensive guidelines for
bank regulation, supervision and
liquidation. To achieve increase in
financial savings during the reform
period, the community banks and
the People's bank were
established. The two set of
institutions were established to
enable rural dwellers and the poor
save and have access to credit at
rates lower than the market rates.
All these structural changes were
aimed at enthroning a marketoriented financial system for
effective mobilization of financial
savings and efficient resource
allocation in the economy.
The liberalization of the banking
industry resulted in the
establishment of many new banks.
The number of operating banks
almost doubled within three years
into the reform (from 45 in 1987 to
76 in 1989) and tripled in the fifth
year (119 in 1991). It required
official re-imposition of embargo
on bank licensing in 1991 to halt
this growth. Profitability of
investment and access to credit
and foreign exchange were
among the major motives for bank
ownership. The competition that
resulted from the entry of new
banks and the liberalization of
interest rates brought about sharp
rise in nominal deposit and lending
rates. The average deposit and
lending rates doubled in the third
year of the reform.
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The banking environment that
emerged from the reform was
inefficient, riskier, illiquid and
generated lower return on assets
relative to the pre-reform period
(Sobodu and Akiode 1994). The
incidence of fraud and of nonperforming loans also increased
with the reform as revealed by a
CBN/NDIC study of Distress in the
financial system. The quality of
management which is a major
determinant of bank's long-term
survival (Siems 1992; Pentalone
and Platt 1987) and the dearth of
qualified personnel to meet the
challenges of sudden growth in the
industry contributed to the poor
health of the banking industry
(Ikhide and Alawode 1994). Thus,
the incidence of distress in the
industry was rampant during the
period. Mindful of the negative
effects of the banking system
distress, the supervisory
authorities adopted various
distress resolution options
including contingency framework
for distress resolution in order to
safeguard the system from
systemic failure. In this context,
problem banks were encouraged to
promptly correct deviations from
sound banking practices and failing
banks were made to exit before
they infected the system. The
monetary authorities also adopted
the code of good practices in
monetary and financial policies, the
international accounting and
auditing standards, as well as
initiated a private sector-funded
“lifeboat” facility accessible to all
DMBs in temporary liquidity
problem. The role of market
discipline was enhanced through
the enforcement of necessary
disclosure requirements that
ensured timely publication of
credible information to guarantee
safe and sound banking practice in
Nigeria. The reforms had some
salutary effects on the banking
system although some
weaknesses persisted.

Following further efforts at
liberalization of the financial sector,
the universal banking scheme was
introduced in 2001 by the Bank to
create a more level-playing field for
financial sector operators,
encourage greater efficiency
through economies of scale and
foster competition by opening up
various areas of entry to banks.
Again, in line with international best
practice, the CBN adopted the core
principles of the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision, including
the prudential guidelines for
licensed banks to promote banking
soundness and financial sector
stability. The supervisory role of the
CBN, aimed at promoting sound
banking and financial system, was
also statutorily expanded to cover
non-bank financial institutions.
Consequently, activities of all the
regulatory and supervisory
authorities in the Nigerian financial
sector were coordinated through
the Financial Sector Regulation and
Coordinating Committee (FSRCC)
under the chairmanship of the CBN.
Furthermore, relevant banking laws
were amended to provide additional
safeguards against insider abuse
and promote good corporate
governance by defining the
functions and responsibilities of a
director and stipulating the
procedures under a director or
he/she or his/her related parties
could obtain credit.
In the first few years of the reform,
the share of the banking system's
credit to the private sector improved
and superseded the flow to
government for the first time in five
years. Later, government's reliance
on the Central Bank of Nigeria for
financing the soaring deficits
overturned the table to its favor.
From an annual average of 50.7%
before the reform, the share of the
private sector in the total credit
declined to 49.7% after the reform.
In 1993 and 1994, only 34% of the
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total credit went to the private sector.
The bulk of the credit that was
channeled to the private sector was
mainly directed toward short-term
investment. Between 1987 and
1994, 50% of the private sector
credits went to call money, 32.5% to
lending maturing within 12 months,
12% for 1-5 years maturity (mediumterm) and only 4.8% for long-term
commitments exceeding five years.
3.2 Recent Reforms in the
Nigerian Banking Industry:
July 2004 Date
3.2.1 Background to the Recent
Reform Measures
In spite of the efforts itemized in the
preceding section, there were still
pockets of distress; overdependence of many Nigerian
banks on public sector deposits and
government revenue collection.
Although the distribution among
banks is not uniform, the
dependency ratios of some banks
were in excess of 70 per cent as at
June 2004. The implication was that
the resource base of such banks
was weak and volatile, rendering
their operations highly vulnerable to
swings in government revenue.
Many banks had abandoned their
traditional intermediation role of
mobilizing savings and inculcating
banking habit at the household and
micro enterprise levels. In addition,
the apathy of some banks towards
small savers, particularly, at the
grass-root level, had not only
compounded the problems of low
domestic savings and high bank
lending rates in the country but had
also reduced access to relatively
cheap and stable funds that could
provide a reliable source of credit to
the productive sectors at affordable
rates of interest. Savings
mobilization at the grass-root level
was inadvertently discouraged
following the unrealistic
requirements by many banks for
new accounts. The summary from
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the foregoing was that the Nigerian
banking system faced enormous
challenges which needed to be
addressed urgently to enable them
perform their catalytic role of
enhancing the growth process in the
e c o n o m y. F u r t h e r m o r e , a
surveillance report by the CBN as at
end-March 2004 indicated that 62
banks out of 89 were classified as
sound/ satisfactory, 14 as marginal,
while the position of unsound banks
had deteriorated from 9 at endDecember 2003 to 11. The report
further indicated that 2 of the banks
failed to render statutory returns
during the period.
An overview of the industry at endDecember 2003 further revealed
that the industry was dominated by
the top 20-30 banks, with 69 banks
out of the 89 licensed banks
operating as marginal players, while
about 60-70 per cent of total
deposits are short-term (30-90
days), and little wonder why banks
were not lending to the real sector.
Other features included extension
of barely 3- 5 per cent of total banks'
credit to agriculture and
manufacturing sectors; and 89
banks in operation having a total
asset of $18.0 billion, compared
with 58 banks in South Africa, with a
total asset of $146 billion. Also, over
N373.1 billion was outside the
banking system due to the failure of
banks to mobilize savings by
offering reasonable interest rate to
small depositors. Savings deposit
rate averaged 3 5 per cent; while
lending rate averaged 21- 32 per
cent.
Quite a number of the banks
examined had revealed severe
weaknesses, including weak
corporate governance, evidenced
by high turnover in the Board and
management staff, inaccurate
reporting and non-compliance with
regulatory requirements, falling

ethics and de-marketing of other
banks in the industry; gross insider
abuses, resulting in huge nonperforming insider related credits.
Other indicators were late or nonpublication of annual accounts that
obviates the impact of market
discipline in ensuring banking
s o u n d n e s s ; i n s o l v e n c y, a s
evidenced by negative capital
adequacy ratios and complete
erosion of shareholders' funds by
operating losses; over-dependence
on public sector deposits, and
neglect of small and medium class
savers.
3.2.2 The Recent Reform
Measures (The 13-point
Agenda)
Mindful of the deteriorating
condition of the industry, the
regulatory authorities decided to
streamline the regulatory
framework and strengthen its
supervisory capacity in order to
forestall the re-emergence of
systemic distress and facilitate the
attainment of the vision of strong,
competitive and reliable financial
markets that meet international
best practices. To this end, the CBN
on July 6, 2004 announced a 13point agenda to reform and
reposition the Nigerian banking
industry.
Key Elements of the Reform

Requirement that the
minimum capitalization for banks
should be N25 billion with full
compliance before end December
2005 (that is 18 months notice
rather than 12 months normally
given in many countries).
i) Only banks that meet the
requirement can hold public sector
deposits, and participate in the DAS
auction by the end of 2005
ii) Publish the names of banks that
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qualify by 31 December, 2005.
Phased withdrawal of public
sector funds from banks, starting in
July, 2004.
Consolidation of banking
institutions through mergers and
acquisitions
Adoption of a risk focused, and
rule-based regulatory framework.
The rules of the game will always
be announced in advance and
these will be respected.
Arbitrariness will be reduced to the
barest minimum. More often,
operators who run foul of the rules
plead for 'political solutions' to
otherwise strictly economic and
financial problems should
understand the damages that such
arbitrariness can do to the system
and the wrong signals and moral
hazards that it creates. Once a
'political solution' is introduced,
there is no end to it and the system
would suffer. In the interest of
preserving the integrity of the
system, transparency and probity,
we will insist on the rules and
regulatory framework, in the
interest of Nigeria and Nigerians.
Adoption of zero tolerance in the
regulatory framework; especially
in the area of data / information
rendition/ reporting. All returns by
banks must be signed by the MDs
of the banks. The so-called 'reengineering' or manipulation of
accounts especially in hiding of
information under 'other assets or
liabilities' and off-balance sheets
will henceforth attract serious
sanctions.
The automation process for
rendition of returns by banks and
other financial institutions through
the Electronic Financial Analysis
and Surveillance System (eFA S S ) w i l l b e c o m p l e t e d
expeditiously.
Establishment of a hot line,
confidential internet address
(Governor@cenbank.org) for all
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Nigerians wishing to share any
confidential information with the
Governor of the Central Bank on the
operations of any bank or the
financial system. Only the Governor
has access to this address.
Strict enforcement of the
contingency planning framework
for systemic banking distress.
Work towards the establishment of
an Assets Management Company
as an important element of distress
resolution.
Promotion of the enforcement of
dormant laws, especially those
relating to the issuance of dud
cheques, and the law relating to the
vicarious liabilities of the Board
Members of banks in cases of
failing by the bank. A situation
where a bank collapses due to
negligence and mismanagement
and the bank directors move about
in their limousines while the poor
depositors languish in pains is just
and unfair. There is a law which
makes the Directors and
management liable and will
henceforth be enforced.
Revision and updating of relevant
laws, and drafting of new ones
relating to the effective operations
of the banking system.
Closer collaboration with the
Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (EFCC) in the
establishment of the Financial
Intelligence Unit (FIU), and the
enforcement of the anti-money
laundering and other economic
crime measures. Greater
transparency and accountability will
be the hallmark of the system.

Rehabilitation and effective
management of the Mint to meet the
security printing needs of Nigeria,
including the banking system which
constitutes over 90 percent of the
Mint's businesses. In due course,
there will be no need to print bank
cheques abroad.

3.2.3

GOALS/OBJECTIVES OF
THE REFORM

The reform was designed to ensure
a diversified, strong and reliable
banking sector, which will ensure
the safety of depositors' money,
play active developmental roles in
the Nigerian economy, and be
competent and competitive players
in the African, Regional and Global
financial system.
The goal of the reform was to help
banks become strong players, and
in a manner that will ensure
longevity and hence high returns to
their shareholders over time and
promote greater impact on the
Nigerian economy. The ultimate
beneficiaries of this policy are the
ordinary men and women who can
put their deposits in the banks and
have a restful sleep; the
entrepreneurial Nigerians who can
now rely on a stronger financial
system to finance their businesses
and economy which will benefit
from internationally connected and
competitive banks that would also
mobilize international capital for
development of the country. This
measure is about the Nigerian
people. It is about meeting their
NEEDS. It is about positioning
Nigeria and Nigerians to become
competitive players in the 21st
century.
4.0

ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE
CBN TOWARDS ENSURING
S U C C E S S F U L
CONSOLIDATION OF THE
NIGERIAN BANKING
INDUSTRY

The CBN was committed to a safe
landing of the consolidation
process in which the cost of
consolidation would be moderate,
while guiding against the trigger of
systemic distress. Consequently,
the Bank issued guidelines and
provided incentives to banks,
69

particularly, weak banks to facilitate
their consolidation efforts; set up a
Technical Committee on Banking
Sector Consolidation and
established a Help Desk in Lagos.
In addition, the CBN set up the
Banking Consolidation
Implementation Committee (BCIC),
whose membership was later
enlarged, to include a SubCommittee on Monitoring. The SubCommittee monitored the progress
of the Consolidation exercise in the
banking industry on full time basis.
Also, the CBN consulted with and
contacted other stakeholders.
Specifically, contacts were made
with Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), Nigerian Stock
Exchange (NSE), Corporate Affairs
Commission (CAC) and Federal
Inland Revenue Services (FIRS),
among others, for the purpose of
ensuring their cooperation in the
area of the promised incentives i.e.
processing fees, tax concessions,
etc. In a related development,
retreat on Mergers and Acquisitions
in the Nigerian Banking Industry
was held with a view to sensitizing
operators for effective
implementation. During the retreat,
observations and suggestions were
made which touched on constraints,
incentives, legal issues and
information technology. Meanwhile,
the Bank has intensified efforts
towards the establishment of an
assets management company as an
important element of distress
resolution, while revision and
updating of relevant laws and
drafting of new ones relating to the
effective operations of the banking
system are being facilitated.
The Bank is also in close
collaboration with the Economic and
Financial Crime Commission
(EFCC) for the enforcement of the
anti-money laundering and other
economic and financial crime
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measures. Other areas of emphasis
include the promotion of the
enforcement of dormant laws,
especially those relating to the
issuance of dud cheques, and
vicarious liabilities of the board
members of banks in cases of
banks failures. There is a law which
makes the Directors and
management liable, which would
henceforth be enforced.
Moreover, the CBN has adopted a
zero tolerance in the regulatory
framework; especially in the area of
d a t a / i n f o r m a t i o n
rendition/reporting. All returns by
banks must now be signed by the
MDs of the banks. The so-called
financial're-engineering' or
manipulation of accounts,
especially in hiding of information
under 'other assets/liabilities' and
off-balance sheet items now attract
serious sanctions. The CBN now
pre-announce the rules of the game
and stick to them.
Furthermore, a risk focused and
rule-based regulatory framework
has been adopted and would take
off later in the year. The Bank
created incentives that involved
writing off of 80 per cent of the debt
owed to it by some banks subject to
the banks recovery of existing bad
loans within two months. The
remaining 20 per cent was to be
converted to a long term debt at
concessional interest rate of 5 per
cent and payable in seven (7) years
excluding a moratorium of two (2)
years.
The Bank intensified efforts to verify
funds raised by banks to shore up
their capital towards meeting the
N25.0 billion. The capital
verification exercise which is an ongoing exercise is to ensure that no
illicit funds or funds borrowed from
the banking sector are used to
finance the purchase of shares.
Finally, in order to provide guidance
to banks on the documentation and

procedural requirements for
consolidation, the Bank prepared
and issued to all banks a manual
incorporating detailed
documentary requirements and
steps needed to be followed at
each stage of the consolidation
process.
5.0

THE OUTCOME OF THE
BANKING SECTOR
CONSOLIDATION
PROGRAMME

At the expiration of the deadline on
31st December 2005, twenty-five
(25) groups emerged from
seventy-five (75) banks out of the
eighty-nine (89) banks that existed
at end- December 2004. The
successful banks accounted for
93.5 per cent of the total deposit
liabilities of the banking system.
Fourteen banks, which neither met
the minimum capital of N25.0
billion nor found merger partners,
had their licenses revoked by the
CBN. Consequently, the Nigeria
Deposit Insurance Corporation
(NDIC) was directed to obtain court
approval to commence the process
of liquidation of the affected banks.
The component members of the
twenty-five consolidated banks are
as shown in the table.
In the process of complying with
the minimum capital requirement,
N406.4 billion was raised by banks
from the capital market out of which
N360 billion was verified and
accepted by the CBN as at endDecember 2005. As a result,
aggregate capital base of the
sector rose from about $3 billion to
$5.9 billion. The programme also
attracted N350.2 billion (nearly
US$3.0 billion) as new investment
and US$500.0 million from Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) inflow. The
banking consolidation programme
has brought a number of positive
developments to the banking
sector in particular and the
economy in general. The
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consolidation has produced
relatively well capitalized banks,
which has engendered greater
public confidence in the system. It
has also brought greater public
awareness of and a deepening of
the capital market.
Aggregate capitalisation of banks
as a share of the stock market
capitalisation rose from 24 per cent
to 38 per cent. The resulting
liquidity in the system also induced
a significant fall in interest rates.
Banks now have greater potential
to finance large transactions with
higher single obligor limit.
Ownership of banks has been
diluted and this will in no small way
tame the monster of insider and
corporate governance abuse as a
new code of corporate governance
had been issued and adopted in
the industry. The banks will of
course enjoy economies of scale
and consequently, pass on the
benefit in the form of reduced bank
charges to their customers.
With virtually all the banks now
publicly quoted, there is wider
regulatory oversight, with
Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and Nigerian
Stock Exchange (NSE) joining the
regulatory team. These regulators
will oversee and focus on fewer
banks thereby fostering
effectiveness and efficiency in
supervision. The programme has
brought to an end the
regionally/ethnically based banks
while encouraging banks to go
global.
6.0

I S S U E S
A N D
CHALLENGES OF THE
P O S T - R E F O R M
MEASURES IN
THE
NIGERIAN BANKING
INDUSTRY

A post consolidation era poses
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some enormous issues and
challenges to virtually every
stakeholder in the banking industry.
On the part of banks, they will
require strong management teams
that are committed to bringing
about overall performance
improvements and capacity
enhancements. Paradigm shifts
would mean that new strategies
would have to be conceptualised
and articulated to address the
increasingly complex issues that
will arise during this post
consolidation era. Specifically,
some of the issues are as follow:
6.1

Increased Customer
Orientation and Focus

As we move into the postconsolidation era, we can expect
customers' expectations to take a
quantum leap. Banking will no
longer involve providing standard
products to customers. In order to
remain relevant as financial
intermediaries, banking institutions
would need to be sensitive to
customer needs for greater
efficiency and convenience. There
would be need for financial
products to be personalized and
customized to the individual needs
of corporate and retail clients.
Banking institutions would
therefore need to be more proactive
and innovative in packaging and
marketing their products. While
customers will expect wider range
of products to be offered, of greater
importance is for the banking
institutions to be able to provide
these products at competitive
pricing. As competition intensifies,
banking institutions will have no
option but to be more innovative in
pricing which will result in further
narrowing of margins. Furthermore,
in such a new financial
environment, the need to ensure
adequate and effective consumer
education and protection would
also become even more crucial and
challenging. The need to prevent

any disruption in the level or
reliability of services to bank
customers and their protection from
potential unfair practices can not be
over-emphasized.
6.2

Strategic Business
Alliance

At the industry level, it is not just a
question of mega banks emerging,
rather, the new financial landscape
will compel the bank management
to re-examine their existing
business models to see where their
strengths lie and to what
opportunities these strengths can
be applied to enhance returns.
There may be the need to move
towards strategic differentiation
among the banks in order to better
serve the relevant market segment
or niches. This may involve market
or functional specialization as
banks decide which functional
areas or combinations of risk
management, customer services,
product innovations, to exploit and
maximize to their advantage. One
way this can be achieved is through
strategic alliances, which is already
widely practiced by global players.
Strategic alliances have become a
viable strategy for banks
contemplating new markets.
Through these alliances, banks can
complement their existing
strengths with those of their
partners' capabilities, distribution
channels, and access to new
markets.
6.3

Continuous Investment
in Human Capital

Towards this end, training and
development of employees must
also be seen as a contributing
factor towards value creation within
the banks rather than merely to
comply with regulatory
requirements or as a non-revenue
function that is costly and
unnecessary. Only with both
competence and commitment from
the organization's workforce, and
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their continuing training and
development, will real strategic
change take place.

6.4

Increased Access to `
Information and
Communication
Technology (ICT)

In this changing economic
landscape, banks would need to
recognize the greater role of
knowledge and ICT. There are some
clear benefits including increased
convenience, increased access to
information, speed of transactions,
and enhanced control and
management of personal finances.
The new innovations will be an
integral part of the financial
landscape. A more logical response
would perhaps be the full integration
of high technology systems into the
brick and mortar facilities that banks
a l r e a d y o f f e r. W i t h o n l i n e
technology, new levels of customer
segmentation can be achieved. In
this context, close coordination
between the existing channels and
the electronic channel is needed to
fully optimize an integrated multichannel approach.
6.5

Post-Consolidation
Integration

The issue of integration of IT,
people, processes etc poses a great
challenge for the post consolidation
banks. The different IT soft wares
and hard wares formerly used by the
banks now coming together need to
be integrated for effective service
delivery. In additions, directors, staff
and processes of the emerging
banks need to be integrated in the
new banks and be orientated in the
business environment.
6.6

Liquidation of the Failed
Banks

Conclusion of the liquidation of the
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fourteen (14) failed banks
constitutes a great challenge for the
CBN as a group of eight banks
(Alliance Group) has gone to court to
challenge the revocation of their
licences. Even when final court
order might have been gotten for
their liquidation, the issue of the
disposal of their assets for the
settlement of the poor depositors is
another problem that may have take
sometime. This brings to the fore the
issue of expediting action on the
establishment of the Assets
Management Company (AMP) as
well as the revision of the necessary
laws that will make it possible for
both the CBN and NDIC to liquidate
failed bank (s) without litigation
action by the bank (s) involved.
6.7

Sound Ethical Banking
Practices

As we undergo the transition
towards a consolidated banking
i n d u s t r y, s t r o n g c o r p o r a t e
governance and risk management
become key part of successful
institutions. With the larger pool of
resources after the merger process,
banks are expected to further
enhance these capabilities.
Specifically, the adoption of best
practices with regard to credit
practices would be monitored,
consistent with the requirement of
the credit risk management
guidelines issued by the CBN.
6.8

Improved regulatory
Framework

The regulatory authorities, on their
part, would be required to further

streamline their regulatory
framework as well as strengthen
their supervisory capacity to ensure
a smooth transition. In this regard,
there would be need to properly
monitor the activities and
performance of emerging mega
banks to prevent distress and
failures in the post-consolidation
era.
6.9

Legal Reforms

Although a number of legislative
iniatives had been taken during the
early reform years to address the
problems in the financial sector and
the economy at large, such as the
review of the Central Bank of
Nigeria, Act (1991) and subsequent
amendment Act of 1998 and 1999;
Banks and Other Financial
Institutions Act (1991) and
subsequent amendment Acts of
1998 and 1999; Failed Banks
(Recovery of Debts) and Financial
Malpractices in Banks Act of 1994,
among others, there is need for
these legal processes to be further
reinforced in order to complement
the efforts of the regulatory
authorities in realizing a sound and
stable banking system. We are
also aware that there is a law
regulating the issue of dud cheque
in the country but the
implementation of this law has not
been effective. In the wake of
growth in the volume and
complexity of financial transactions
involving both local and foreign
investors after the consolidation
exercise, there is need for both the
legislature and the judiciary to
cooperate as well as work closely in
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the implementation of the existing
law on dud cheque in order to
engender some confidence in the
new financial landscape that will
eventually merge.
With respect to loans recovery
within the framework of the banking
industry, the challenges posed by
this is not only for the regulators
and operators in the industry, but
also for the judiciary who must be at
the fore-front in ensuring that cases
bordering on loan recovery are
promptly disposed of, bearing in
mind that justice delayed is justice
denied. To this end, special courts
that will handle cases of loan
defaults and credit fraud with
dispatch need to be considered in
the present banking policy reforms.
7.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The new agenda in the Nigerian
banking industry has identified the
building blocks for an effective and
efficient financial system that will
meet international best practice.
The various initiatives (the 13-point
agenda) that are required to realize
this vision constitute the building
blocks. It needs to be recognized,
however, that the realization of the
vision involves the cooperation of
all the stakeholders in the industry.
While the foundations are being
laid and plans are in place to
pursue the agenda to a successful
end, the future is by no means
secure. It is only with the combined
efforts of all that the probability of
achieving a virile banking sector in
which depositors can have
confidence in, will be realised.
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24
25

Component Members of Consolidated Banks
Bank Name
Members of the Group
Access Bank Plc
Marina Bank, Capital Bank International, Access Bank
Afribank Plc
Afribank Plc, Afrimerchant Bank
Diamond Bank Plc
Diamond Bank, Lion Bank, African International Bank (AIB)
EcoBank
EcoBank
ETB Plc
Equatorial Trust Bank (ETB), Devcom
FCMB Plc
FCMB, Co-operative Development Bank, Nig-American Bank,
Midas Bank
Fidelity Bank Plc
Fidelity Bank, FSB, Manny Bank
First Bank Plc
FBN plc, FBN Merchant Bank, MBC
FirstInland Bank Plc
IMB, Inland Bank, First Atlantic Bank, NUB
Guaranty Trust Plc
GT Bank
IBTC-Chartered Bank Plc
Regent, Chartered, IBTC
Intercontinental Bank Plc
Global, Equity, Gateway, Intercontinental
NIB
Nigerian International Bank
Oceanic Bank Plc
Oceanic Bank, In't Trust Bank
Platinum-Habib Bank Plc
Platinum Bank, Habib Bank
Skye Bank Plc
Prudent Bank, Bond Bank, Coop Bank, Reliance Bank, EIB
Springbank Bank Plc
Guardian Express Bank, Citizens Bank, Fountain Trust Bank,
Omega Bank,, Trans International Bank, ACB
Stanbic Bank Ltd
Stanbic Bank
Standard Chartered Bank Standard Chartered Bank Ltd
Ltd
Sterling Bank Plc
Magnum Trust Bank, NBM Bank, NAL Bank, INMB, Trust Bank
of Africa
UBA Plc
STB, UBA, CTB
Union Bank Plc
Union Bank, Union Merchant Bank, Universal Trust Bank, Broad
Bank
Unity Bank Plc
New Africa Bank, Tropical Commercial Bank, Centre-Point Bank,
Bank of the North, NNB, First Interstate Bank, Intercity Bank,
Societe Bancaire, Pacific Bank
Wema Bank Plc
Wema Bank, National Bank
Zenith International Bank Plc Zenith International Bank Plc
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